V. Section 16(B) by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 34 | Issue 3 Article 9
Summer 6-1-1977
V. Section 16(B)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
V. Section 16(B), 34 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 966 (1977), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/
vol34/iss3/9
966 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
mon law tort of interference with a prospective economic advantage.
The court of appeals concluded from the existence of this cause of
action at state law that Congress would have announced explicitly an
intention to grant a private remedy to offerors had it so intended.'20
The Supreme Court, however, used the existence of the state cause
of action to infer that if Congress had intended to create a duplicate
federal remedy, it would have stated that intention clearly.1 2' Simi-
larly, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,'22 the Court stated that
in the absence of a clear command from Congress, it would hesitate
to override established state policies of corporate law.'2 This ration-
ale is also the moving force behind the holding in Piper. The Court
would not assume that Congress intended offerors to have a damage
remedy unless that remedy was essential to accomplishment of the
statutory purpose. In the future, those who seek expansion of federal




The primary objective of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34
Act) is to provide a free and open market for trading securities with
all traders having access to the same relevant market information.'
"1 480 F.2d at 360-61; see note 96 supra.
121 Professor Loss, in a discussion of implied private rights of action under § 14(a),
states that statutory silence neither supports nor detracts from the proposition that
there should be a private remedy under the '34 Act. 2 L. Loss, SEcuarriEs REGULATION
942 (2d ed. 1961).
1- 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977).
'2 Id. at 1303-04.
121 In Green, id. at 1304, the Court cites Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974). Professor Cary takes the
position that federal regulation of corporate fairness and fiduciary duties cannot be
achieved through the vehicle of rule 10b-5. Rather, he advocates federal legislation as
a "counterattack against the erosion of standards" brought about by the economic
benefits available to states with lenient corporation laws. Id.
1 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hh (1970) as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78b-78kk (Supp. V 1975)
('34 Act). See generally Yourd, Trading Securities by Directors, Officers and Stock-
holders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MICH. L. REv. 133 (1939). The
Securities Act Amendments of 1975 reiterate the objective of a free and open market
for trading securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (Supp. V 1975). The Amendments declare that
SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
Congress, recognizing the easy access of corporate officers, directors
and substantial stockholders to a corporation's confidential informa-
tion, enacted section 16(b) of the '34 Act to insure that these corpo-
rate insiders would not take personal advantage of such inside infor-
mation.2 This section provides for recovery by the corporation of all
profits realized by insiders on purchases and sales of their corpora-
tion's securities made within a six month period, commonly referred
to as short swing trading.
3
Originally, federal courts applied the statute mechanically, and
held insiders strictly liable for all short swing profits regardless of any
possibility for speculative abuse.' This strict liability' approach pre-
securities markets are a national asset and that it is in the national interest to protect
investors through the maintenance of fair and orderly markets. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1
(Supp. V 1975).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)(1970). See, e.g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir.
1959). See generally Note, Extraterritorial Application of Section 16(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699, 708-10 (1975).
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity secu-
rity of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period
of less than six months . . . shall inure to and be recovered by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director or officer ...
A beneficial owner under the '34 Act is any person who directly or indirectly owns more
than 10% any class of a corporation's equity securities. Id. § 78p(a). The term equity
security is broadly defined in the '34 Act to include any stock or similar security and
securities or warrants which carry with them the right to convert or purchase a stock
or similar security. Id. § 78c(11). The Securities Exchange Commission is given discre-
tion to promulgate rules and regulations concerning the securities which it deems an
equity security. !d.
See, e.g., Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947). In Park & Tilford, three controlling owners of a company con-
verted preferred shares to common shares because the corporation had ordered an
automatic redemption of all preferred shares at an exchange value below that of volun-
tary conversion. The court mechanically held that this exchange constituted a pur-
thase since before the conversion the insiders owned no common stock while after the
conversion they did. When this common stock was sold within six months, the court
held the three statutory insiders liable under § 16(b) without full inquiry into any
mitigation of the possibility of insider abuse caused by this economically forced conver-
sion. See also Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943). See generally Wentz, Refining A Crude Rule: The Pragmatic Approach of
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 221, 225 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Wentz].
5 Hearings prior to the adoption of § 16(b) described the provision as a "crude rule
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sumed that statutory insiders had access to confidential market infor-
mation and that they had misused the information if they profited
on short swing transactions.7 The Supreme Court in Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,' however, held that certain
"unorthodox" transactions9 warranted a more flexible analysis than
traditional cash-for-stock transactions.'" The Court stated that prof-
its realized on unorthodox transactions should not automatically trig-
ger 16(b) liability; in such instances, the courts should determine
of thumb" designed to prevent insiders from realizing profits on inside information.
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. On Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
6557 (1934)(Statement of Thomas Corcoran). See Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425
F.2d 348, 350 n.2 (2d Cir. 1970). Section 16(b) has been described as "a hatchet, not a
scalpel," since it requires removal of all profits regardless of proof of any actual insider
abuse. McElroy, Pragmatic Disgorging of Insider Profits: A Review of Cases Reported
Under Section 16(b), 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 473 (1975). See Bershad v. McDonough, 428
F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
1 See Foremost-McKesson Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232, 245
(1976); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1947), Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
' Provident Securities Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601, 611 (9th Cir.
1974), aff'd 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
411 U.S. 582 (1973).
Unorthodox transactions were defined by the Kern Court as those transactions
"not ordinarily deemed a sale or purchase" of securities, such as "stock conversions,
exchanges pursuant to mergers and other corporate reorganizations, stock reclassifica-
tions, dealings in options, rights and warrants." Id. at 593 n.24, 594. But cf. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335, 351 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976) (use by purchaser of warrants as consideration for stock
purchases was a substitute for cash and demanded a forfeiture of short swing profits
under § 16(b)).
" 411 U.S. at 593-96. In Kern, Occidential Petroleum attempted a takeover of
Kern by a tender offer to Kern's shareholders. The tender offer failed when Kern
defensively merged with Tenneco Corporation. Occidential had become a ten percent
beneficial owner of Kern in May, 1967 and had made purchases of Kern stock in June,
1967. Seeking to rid itself of the Tenneco preferred stock which it would receive pur-
suant to the Kern-Tenneco merger agreement exchange, Occidential granted Tenneco
an option which became irrevocable in August, 1967 and exercisable December 9, 1967
to purchase its Tenneco shares six months and one day after Occidential's last pur-
chase of Kern stock. The Kern Court found no § 16(b) liability because Occidential
lacked access to inside information due to its hostile relationship with the Kern man-
agement and because it lacked over the merger negotiations which had dictated the
conversion of Kern common shares into Tenneco preferred shares. See generally Lang
& Katz, Section 16(b) and "Extraordinary" Transactions: Corporate Reorganizations
and Stock Options, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 705 (1974); Wentz, supra note 4 at 237-39;
Note, Section 16(b) Liability for Profits Realized From a Cash Purchase and Sale
Within Six Months of the Securities of Two Insiders Involved in an Intervening
Reorganization, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1975).
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whether the transaction was, in actuality, one which gave rise to
possible misuse of inside information." This determination was based
on a two part inquiry concerning whether the statutory insider had
access to inside information and, if so, whether he had sufficient
control over the transaction to enable abusive trading." Recent sec-
tion 16(b) litigation has focused on the identification of unorthodox
transactions and the application of the Kern Court's liberalizing two
pronged test.
In Rosen v. Drisler'3 and Freedman v. Barrow,4 plaintiffs, corpo-
rate stockholders suing derivatively, challenged stock appreciative
rights (SARs) as per se violations of section 16(b). An SAR grants
persons possessing a stock option'" the right to surrender the option
to the corporation in exchange for cash or securities or a combination
thereof equal to the increased value of the option on the date the SAR
is exercised.'" The plaintiffs contended that SAR transactions repre-
sented an exercise of this option,' 7 followed by a simultaneous sale of
11 411 U.S. at 595. See Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
,2 411 U.S. at 598-600.
,5 421 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
"[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,754 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
4, 1976).
Is A stock option is a contract made by a corporation with an individual extending
an irrevocable offer to purchase stocks for a stipulated period and price. An option is
generally distinguishable from a warrant, seenote 37 infra, in that an option is usually
non-transferable and is usually attached to either preferred shares or a debt security.
Z. CAVITCH, 4A BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 92,021 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
," 42 Fed. Reg. 754, 755 (1977), to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3. The
purposes for the SAR transactions varied greatly in Rosen and Freedman. In Rosen,
the management sought to remove three corporate officers from key roles within the
corporation. Each of these officers had options to purchase substantial blocks of the
corporation's common stock. To prevent these officers from obtaining this proprietary
interest, the corporation negotiated an SAR type transaction where each officer re-
ceived a cash settlement approximating the spread between the option price and the
current market price for a common share. 421 F. Supp. at 1284.
In Freedman, the SAR was used as a portion of Exxon Corporation's executive
incentive program. Exxon and other large U.S. corporations had initiated programs
where options were issued to executives to allow them to participate in the profits of
the corporation. To take advantage of this opportunity, the executives borrowed money
at interest rates below the expected dividend rate of the corporate stock hoping to
exercise these options later and realize a portion of the profit of the corporation.
Because of the drastic rise in interest rates in 1971-1974, Exxon adopted the SAR to
relieve employees from borrowing money at high rates in order to enjoy the benefits of
their option rights. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,754 at
90,711.
,7 Exercise of an option qualifies as a § 16(b) purchase of securities. See Keller
19771
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securities with the cash or stock settlement representing the short
swing profit realized in the transaction.'8
Utilizing different rationales, the Rosen and Freedman courts
both held that no section 16(b) liability attached to these SAR trans-
actions.8 The Rosen court accepted the plaintiffs argument that an
SAR amounted to an exercise of an option and simultaneous sale,
but, applying the Kern two pronged test,'2 found that the simultane-
ous nature of the purchase and sale provided no time span for short
Indus., Inc. v. Walden, 462 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1972)(exercise of option presents all the
indicia of an outright purchase of securities). Stock options are equity securities and,
therefore, any purchase or sale of an option is included within the § 16(b) six month
restriction on insider trading. See note 3 supra. SEC Rule 16b-3, however, exempts
from § 16(b) liability any acquisition of stock pursuant to a stock bonus plan and any
acquisition of stock options pursuant to a stock option plan. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3
(1976). The rule, however, does not exempt the acquisition of stock upon the exercise
of an option. Id.
11 Rosen v. Drisler, 421 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Freedman v. Barrow,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,754 at 90,712 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 4, 1976). In Freedman, the plaintiff also premised liability on the theory that an
insider SAR transaction equaled an exercise of a stock option coupled with an immedi-
ate sale of a portion of the stock acquired to cover out of pocket expenses. [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,754 at 90,713. Any statutory insider
who exercised options and immediately sold the cost portion and retained only the
profit portion of the shares was presumed to violate § 16(b)'s strictures prohibiting
purchases and sales within a six month period. Id. See Keller Indus., Inc. v. Walden,
462 F.2d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 1972); Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 256
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). Cf. Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir. 1947)
(purchase given broad statutory definition).
11 421 F. Supp. at 1288; [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,754 at 90,714. The Rosen and Freedman courts both initially identified the SAR
transactions as unorthodox transactions. This determination was founded on the fact
that SARs involve options and also because plaintiffs' attempts to carve up an SAR
transaction into a simultaneous purchase and sale did not fall within the literal phra-
seology of § 16(b). 421 F. Supp. at 1286; [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,754 at 90,710. See note 9 supra.
20 See text accompanying note 12 supra. The Rosen court presumed that the
insiders had access to inside information and thus satisfied the first part of the Kern
test. This presumption of access to inside information is justified since the three
officers granted SARs by the corporation had fiduciary responsibilities to remain
knowledgeable and to participate in corporate decisions. See, e.g., Kavanaugh v.
Gould, 223 N.Y. 103, 106, 119 N.E. 237, 238 (1918). Nevertheless, the purpose of the
SAR transaction of eliminating these officers arguably places these insiders in a hostile
relationship with the corporate management thereby justifying further analysis of the
officers' actual access to confidential information. Cf. Kern County Land Co. v. Occi-
dential Petroleum Co., 411 U.S. 582, 596 (1973)(ten percent beneficial owner unwanted
as a minority shareholder by management warranted inquiry into his actual access to
inside information).
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swing speculation." The court also found lacking any element of con-
trol by the insiders since the timing of the SAR transaction was
dictated by the corporation rather than the insiders possessing the
options.22 On the other hand, the Freedman court reasoned that SAR
transactions did not involve the exercise of corporate stock options,
but rather the surrender or lapse of such options.? Without a pur-
chase,2" prior and subsequent sales of stock were not in violation of
section 16(b). Since no stock certificates attached to the surrender or
lapse of the stock options, the court refused to analogize SAR transac-
tions to a short swing exercise and sale of stock options. 5 The
Freedman court declared that Kern's practical and balanced applica-
tion of section 16(b) precluded any strained bifurcation of a. single
SAR transaction in order to fit the transaction within the proscriptive
purview of the '34 Act.
2 6
Although the Rosen and Freedman courts reached the same re-
sult, they utilized diverse analyses in applying the Kern rationale.
The Rosen court narrowly interpreted Kern as permitting a liberal-
ized inquiry into whether section 16(b) liability exists under the two
pronged test of access and control. However, while the Kern Court
applied this test to determine if a purchase-sale transaction gave rise
to speculative abuse, its liberalizing rationale would seem to allow an
inquiry into whether a purchase or sale ever occurred. The Freedman
court utilized Kern in such an expansive manner to justify a more
fundamental inquiry into the overall applicability of section 16(b).
The court inquired not only into the possibility of speculative abuse
in the transaction,2 but also into the more general question of
21 421 F. Supp. at 1286-87.
421 F. Supp. at 1287. The board of directors controlled the dollar amount of the
spread between the option price and the market price of the common stock because
the market price was fixed as the market price on the day the board approved the SAR.
Id. at 1284.
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,754 at 90,712-13.
The Freedman court also presumed that the corporate executive had access to inside
information. Since these insiders occupied a favored position in the corporation, this
presumption appears well founded. See note 20 supra.
28 See note 17 supra.
2 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,754 at 90,713. See
text accompanying note 18 supra.
28 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,754 at 90,713-14.
' 421 F. Supp. at 1287-88. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidential Petroleum
Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 600 (1973); Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 344 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958).
1 The determination of whether there is a possibility for insider speculative abuse
demands a difficult assessment of the mechanics of complex schemes used to shroud
1977]
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whether the SAR transaction itself constituted a conventional, as
opposed to technical, section 16(b) purchase or sale of securities."9
The Freedman court found that the exercise of an SAR was not a sale
of a stock option right to the corporation or an exercise of the option,
but rather constituted a surrender or cancellation of the option in
exchange for any profit which would have been realized had an option
been exercised and purchased by the corporation. 0
Importantly, section 16(b) liability is founded on a determination
that a purchase and sale of equity securities took place and not
merely upon a finding that the challenged transaction duplicated the
result of a theoretical purchase and sale transaction. The Freedman
inquiry properly recognized section 16(b) as a narrowly confined pros-
criptive remedy which applies only to actual short swing purchase
and sale situations." Through a comprehensive and realistic analysis
of the mechanics of SAR transactions, the Freedman court avoided
the difficult determination of insider trading abuse by refusing to
bifurcate a single transaction into a hypothetical purchase and sale
transaction. Thus, the Freedman decision correctly refocused post-
Kern section 16(b) liability determinations on the critical issue of
whether a purchase or sale of equity securities occurred.
Recently adopted changes to SEC Rules 16(b)-3 and 16(b)-6 sup-
port the results in both Rosen and Freedman and may effectively
moot future litigation of SAR transactions under section 16(b).
32
These rules recognize SAR transactions as legitimate tools for execu-
tive compensation and exempt SARs from section 16(b) coverage.
3 3
In accommodation of the distinctions drawn by Rosen and Freedman,
the rules demand disinterested administration of corporate SAR
plans by persons ineligible for selection as recipients of SARs and
describe SARs as expirations or surrenders of stock options to the
insider trading abuses. See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co.,
506 F.2d 601, 610-14 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
21 Cf. Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973)(no automatic rule that an
exchange is or is not a purchase or sale). See Wentz, supra note 4, at 240-43.
11 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,754 at 90,712-13.
31 Id. at 90,713-14.
32 42 Fed. Reg. 754 (1977), to be codified in 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-3, 240.16b-6.
31 These newly adopted SEC rules are subject to federal judicial scrutiny. See,
e.g., Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Judicial review
of SEC rules is limited, in that the court "may not substitute its judgment for the more
informed and expert judgment of the Commission." Id. The Commission must have
abused its power or overstepped its statutory authority before a federal court may
exercise its power to review and act. Id. See generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 21.01 (1958).
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corporate issuers.34 These guidelines, together with the decisions in
Rosen and Freedman, properly identify SARs as executive compensa-
tion programs which afford insiders little control over transactions
and which do not involve traditional purchases and sales of securities.
In another recent decision, Morales v. Mapco Inc.,35 the Tenth
Circuit refused to make a similar section 16(b) exemption for stock
transactions which involved an insider actually exercising stock war-
rants prior to their mandatory conversion into common stock. In
Morales, Ross, the financial vice president of Mapco, 1 purchased
3,616 warrants" at $9.00 per warrant which were automatically con-
vertible into one-half shares of Mapco common stock on April 1,
1972.38 These warrants included the additional right to pay another
$9.00 per warrant any time prior to the expiration date and thereby
convert each warrant into one full share of Mapco.3 9 Just prior to the
mandatory conversion date, when the market price of Mapco had
risen to more than $40.00 per share, Ross executed three transactions:
first, between February 29th and March 23rd, he exchanged 1,100
warrants and paid $9,900.00 for 1,100 shares of Mapco stock; second,
almost simultaneous with each of these exchanges, Ross sold the
shares of common stock on the New York Stock Exchange; and fi-
nally, on March 24th, Ross exchanged his remaining 2,516 warrants
and paid $22,644.00 for 2,516 Mapco common shares." By paying the
3, 42 Fed. Reg. 759 (1977). The new rules themselves have been subject to a
proposed amendment which clarified the control of the SAR transactions by disinter-
ested corporate management. Under the original rules, the corporate board of directors
or executive committee was not required to control the insider's right to exercise his
SAR. The proposed amendment clarified Rule 16b(c)(3) to include a board or commit-
tee power to approve or disapprove any insider's exercise of his SAR. 42 Fed. Reg.
15,923 (1977).
- 541 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 768 (1977).
31 The district court and the Tenth Circuit inferred from Ross' status as an officer
of the corporation that he had access to inside information. Morales v. Mapco, Inc.,
541 F.2d 233, 236-37 (10th Cir. 1976) rev'g [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) I 95,094.at 97,879 (N.D. Okl. Apr. 10, 1975). See note 20 supra.
37 A corporate warrant constitutes a right to purchase shares of a corporation.
Such warrants are customarily traded both on the stock exchanges and in the over-
the-counter market. 1 L. Loss, SEcuarrms REGULATION 467 (2d ed. 1961).
1 541 F.2d at 234. Ross purchased all 3616 warrants between March, 1964 and
June, 1971. Thus, if the warrant conversions were found merely to be an exchange of
economic equivalents, sales after January, 1972 would all occur outside the § 16(b)
statutory period. See Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954); note 43 infra.
11 541 F.2d at 234.
40 Id. 234-35. The price of a common share of Mapco varied during this period from
$41.00 to $43.25. Assuming the higher of these prices, Ross received Mapco stock
valued at $108,817.00 and $47,575.00 in cash from a total cash investment of $65,088.00
1977]
974 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
additional $9.00 per warrant, Ross, along with ninety-eight percent
of all warrant holders effectively doubled the amount of profits real-
ized in his purchase of Mapco warrants."
In a stockholder's derivative suit brought in federal district court,
the court held Ross' transactions did not constitute a section 16(b)
violation.2 The court reasoned that the insider warrant transactions
did not constitute a purchase of stock but rather merely an exchange
of economic equivalents.43 Ownership of a Mapco warrant plus $9.00
was held to equal ownership of a full share of Mapco.4 The district
court also found that the almost simultaneous nature of the conver-
sion and sale gave Ross no time span in which to misuse his insider
position. 5 Finally, the court emphasized Ross' lack of control by find-
ing that, to the extent Ross would have forfeited a substantial profit
for the purchase of the warrants and the additional $9.00 necessary to effect the
conversion. Thus, he realized a profit of $91,304.00 on his actual warrant transaction.
11 Assuming the market price remained the same, had Ross waited until the auto-
matic conversion date, he would have held 1,808 Mapco shares valued at $78,196.00
from an investment of $32,544.00 for the purchase of the warrants. This would have
given him a profit of only $45,652.00, $45,652.00 less than the profit he realized by the
exchange. See note 40 supra.
" [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,094 at 97,880.
4 The concept of economic equivalents was first raised in Ferraiolo v. Newman,
259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958). In Ferraiolo, a director converted preferred shares to
common shares and sold the common shares within six months of this conversion. 259
F.2d at 344. The court, declaring a policy of avoiding "black letter rubric," held that
every transaction which could reasonably be defined as a purchase must be so defined
if the transaction lends itself to § 16(b) speculative abuse. However, absent such
opportunity for speculative abuse the definition of a purchase need not be expanded
to encompass these transactions. Id. at 344-45. The court then analyzed the transaction
of converting preferred shares for common shares to ascertain whether it qualified as
a § 16(b) purchase. First, the court announced that preferred shares, due to their
undilutable conversion privilege to common stock, constitutes the economic equivalent
of common shares. Further, the court found that this conversion of economic equiva-
lents did not give rise to speculative abuse since all preferred shareholders were treated
alike, full disclosure was made to all shareholders, there was no material change in
ownership, the transaction had none of the economic indicia of apurchase, and finally,
since the corporation was going to redeem automatically all preferred shares at a price
$9.00 less than the price of common stock, conversion was economically involuntary.
Id. at 346. See generally Comment, Conversion To Avert Redemption Is Not a "Short-
Swing" Purchase, 11 STAN. L. REV. 358 (1959).
11 [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,094 at 97,878-79.
Much like the preferred shares which sold for the same price as common shares in
Ferraiolo, see note 43 supra, the Morales district court accepted testimony which
indicated that Mapco warrants sold for the same price as Mapco common shares less
the $9.00 conversion differential.
11 Id. at 97,879. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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by not exchanging his warrants, the exchange was involuntary.48
The Tenth Circuit's reversal and finding of section 16(b) liability
rejected each of the district court's bases for nonliability. The court
of appeals acknowledged an exemption from section 16(b) liability
when an insider converted true equivalents.47 The court, however,
held that Ross' transactions did not involve equivalents because there
was a change in equity ownership since Mapco warrants were only a
right to purchase whereas common stock gave an ownership interest
in Mapco,48 and because the conversion required the payment of an
additional $9.00, making Mapco warrants economically unequal on
their face to Mapco common shares. The Tenth Circuit also rejected
the position that the transactions were involuntary, since Ross exer-
cised his warrants upon his "voluntary" payment of the additional
$9.00. Finally, the court refused to adopt the district court's analysis
48 See notes 40-41 supra. The court's position on the economically involuntary
nature of Ross' exchange is supported by the fact that ninety-eight percent of all
Mapco warrant holders elected to exchange their warrants prior to the automatic
conversion date. This same situation existed in Ferraiolo. Compare [1974-1975 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,094 at 97,879 with Ferraiolo v. Newman,
259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958) (99% of preferred shareholders converted to common
shares).
'1 The Tenth Circuit noted Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958) as
an example of an exchange of true equivalents. 541 F.2d at 235. The Morales court,
however, emphasized the Ferraiolo decision's requirements of a situation involving an
exchange of equivalents situation which did not present an increase in the possibility
of speculative abuse. Specifically, the court demanded that the exchange of equiva-
lents not materially alter the proportions of equity ownership, be involuntary because
of the possibility of monetary loss, and have none of the economic indicia of a purchase.
Id. at 235 citing Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958). See note 43
supra. Other courts have used the Ferraiolo criteria as the basis for determining
whether a true exchange of equivalents has taken place. Compare Petteys v. Butler,
367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967)(conversion of preferred
to common stock dictated by corporate decision to redeem preferred stock at substan-
tial discount from equivalent common stock not a § 16(b) purchase) with Bershad v.
McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971)(agreement
granting option which passed stock into escrow and gave grantee proxy to vote qualifies
as § 16(b) sale) and Booth v. Varian Assoc., 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 961 (1965)(exchange of stock between two corporations where price fixed on
closing day constituted a purchase within § 16(b)).
' 541 F.2d at 235-36. See note 47 supra.
541 F.2d at 235. Ross' paying cash to the corporation gave the exchange of
Mapco warrants an ecohomic indicia of a purchase. See note 47 supra. Like the
Freedman court's refusal to bifurcate an SAR transaction into a purchase and sale,
see text accompanying notes 29-30 supra, the Morales court did not theorize that Ross'
warrant transactions duplicated the result of the automatic conversion of economic
equivalents as to the one half shares of Mapco which Ross would have obtained.
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that the simultaneous nature of the transactions removed any possi-
bility for insider trading abuse.A5
The court's reasoning on this final point is ambiguous. The dis-
trict court's conclusion that there was no time span for abuse within
each separate and simultaneous warrant exchange and resultant sale
of stock seems reasonable since the rationale of the Rosen court in
analyzing SARs would be applicable here.5 1 There were, however,
prior and subsequent warrant exercise-sale transactions conducted at
varying intervals which could be matched with each simultaneous
purchase and sale transaction. For example, the exercise of 2,516
warrants on March 24th could be matched with the sale of 200 shares
in the simultaneous transaction on February 28th. Thus, although
the simultaneous nature of the initial transactions might have re-
moved any possibility for speculative abuse between that exercise
and sale, it did not remove such possibility between those purchases
and sales and the prior and subsequent purchases and sales within
the six month period of section 16(b). Because the Tenth Circuit did
not adequately present this reasoning, the Morales opinion can be
criticized; but because there was more than one simultaneous trans-
action within six months, the court's conclusion was correct.
The Morales decision also represents a harsh position toward cor-
porate insider trading despite the liberalizing analysis of Kern. To
prove an exchange of equivalents, the Morales court demanded an
exchange of identical ownership interests as well as economic value
equivalents.2 The distinction between owning a share of the company
and owning the right to purchase a share, however, appears to be an
attenuated interpretation of the concept of ownership equivalence.
The court's conclusion, however, is supportable since the introduc-
tion of cash into the exchange destroyed any true economic equiva-
lence.
The position of the Morales court on the voluntariness of these
transactions clearly demonstrates the court's strict application of sec-
541 F.2d at 236.
11 Section 16(b) eliminated short swing insider transactions. When purchases and
sales are immediate, there is no time span in which an insider can benefit from confi-
dential information. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
52 The language in the Ferraiolo opinion supports the Tenth Circuit's position that
there must be some equivalence in ownership interests in order for a transaction to be
characterized as an exchange of equivalents. See note 47 supra.
53 Any distinction between warrants and stocks is especially tenuous in view of the
inclusion of both within the '34 Act's broad definition of equity securities. See note 3
supra.
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tion 16(b). The court identified these transactions- as voluntary
merely because Ross voluntarily initiated the exchange when he paid
the additional $9.00 for conversion. That payment, however, was dic-
tated by the terms levied by the corporation in its warrant contract. 4
The court constructed a voluntariness test which focused on the me-
chanics of the conversion rather than on the economic forces, such as
the loss of money if the securities were left unconverted, which has
played the critical role in determinations of involuntariness by other
courts. 5 Under this test, few situations can possibly arise where the
warrant, option, or preferred stockholder does not take some volun-
tary action in initiating the conversion process."
Although the Morales court may have erroneously held that Ross'
exercise of warrants was voluntary, an opposite holding of involuntar-
iness does not automatically mean that the warrant exercise was not
a section 16(b) purchase. In Kern, the Supreme Court declared that
involuntariness exempted purchases or sales from coverage under the
'34 Act only when coupled with an absence of speculative abuse. 7
Since the series of purchases and sales in Morales gave rise to a
possibility that Ross could misuse his inside information,58 these war-
rant exercises remained within the reach of section 16(b).
Morales reached an appropriate result despite an overly strict
interpretation of the voluntariness element of the Kern test. While
this departure from a traditional measurement of voluntariness was
not critical in the Morales situation since there was a possibility for
insider abuse, future litigation where there is no such possibility
could be incorrectly decided if courts elect to adopt the Morales court
definition of voluntariness. 8 Such a result, however, seems unlikely
541 F.2d at 234.
See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidential Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 600
(1973); American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 100 (1975); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 534 (8th Cir. 1966);
Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958). See generally Note,
Involuntariness and Other Contemporary Problems Under Section 16(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 27 HAsTMis L.J. 679 (1976).
56 See, e.g., Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958). In Ferraiolo,
the corporate insider voluntarily surrendered his preferred stock to the corporation to
initiate the conversion of these preferred shares into common shares. Under the
Morales test, such an initiation would have removed this conversion from considera-
tion as involuntary.
11 411 U.S. at 600. The Kern Court held: "the involuntary nature of the possibility
of speculative abuse of inside information, convinces us that § 16(b) should not apply
."Id.
See text accompanying note 51 supra.
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given the weight of contrary authority, buttressed by the Kern deci-
sion."
JON P. LECKERLING
5' See note 55 supra.
